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THE PUBLIC SECTOR: BUDGETS AND BARGAINING
DONALD W. BRODIE*
The so-called "taxpayers' revolt" is an old phenomenon combin-
ing a specific dislike for paying taxes and a more general dislike for
large government. The modern version of this "revolt" has received
renewed attention in recent years, particularly in California.I Superim-
posed on the problem of taxpayers' revolt is the recent and more com-
plex financial crisis of large cities, such as New York City, which face
possible bankruptcy. 2 The causes underlying these conditions are high-
ly complex, but the immediate effect of both the crisis and the revolt is
to sharply diminish public employers' budgets. The diminished bud-
gets, in turn, have significant consequences in public sector collective
bargaining. It is the purpose of this article to examine the relationship
between public budgets and public sector bargaining in general and
some aspects of the impact on collective bargaining caused by the tax-
payers' revolt and financial crises in particular. The article will focus
primarily on collective bargaining at the state and local government
level, not at the federal level. It will be necessary, however, to consider
some special relationships affecting collective bargaining that may be
created by the local acceptance of federal money.
This article will identify several conclusions about the subject, but
cautions should be noted. First, in those jurisdictions where it exists,
state and local level collective bargaining is primarily a statutory sub-
ject. As such, the rules are subject to immediate change at the will of
the appropriate legislative body,3 and the subject matter is therefore far
from stable. Second, the real extent and scope of the taxpayers' revolt
and the fiscal crises are still unknown. Whether they are momentary
phenomena or long term trends is uncertain. If the budgetary plight of
* Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law. J.D., New York University; B.A.,
University of Washington.
1. See, e.g., 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1724 (July 8, 1978) regarding federal implications of
California Proposition 13. See Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281 (1978) (validity of proposition 13
sustained).
2. One concise examination of the New York situation is Weitzman, The Effect ofEconomic
Restraints on Public Sector Collective Bargaining The Lessons of New York City, 2 EMPL. REL.
L.J. 286 (1977).
3. The relative uniformity of statutory, administrative, and judge-made law of the private
sector was lost in the decision of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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public employers worsens significantly, the rules will probably undergo
substantial changes. Third, both the crises and the revolt, in their pres-
ent forms, are relatively new. At this point, the reactions of the legisla-
tures and the courts are still probably closer to reflexive responses than
to analytical solutions directed toward remedying the underlying
causes. These notions suggest that there is much law remaining to be
developed, which may render today's conclusions only temporary.
Again, the primary focus is on the state and local government and
on the public employee who is engaged in collective bargaining. It is
not the purpose of this paper to fashion the ultimate definition of the
public employee; however, some limitations on the class are worth not-
ing. For a public employer facing financial difficulty, all personnel
costs affect the budget equally. However, not all public employees may
be subject to the rules of collective bargaining, even in those jurisdic-
tions having legislation permitting public sector bargaining. The rules
applicable to the unionized public employee are different than those for
the unrepresented public employee. The differences lie not only in the
administrative and judicial overlay of collective bargaining, but also in
the basic political nature of the relationship.
Although the focus here is solely on the unionized public em-
ployee, it is useful to identify some of those classes which might not be
covered. Public sector bargaining legislation usually excludes the judi-
cial branch, so employees associated with the judiciary may not be cov-
ered.4 Multistate agencies 5 or agencies formed by voluntary
agreement6 by several local government entities may not be covered.
Some police may hold office by appointment rather than employment.
7
Temporary employees may be excluded. 8 Organizations funded by
both private and public money may not be subject to collective bar-
gaining jurisdiction. 9 The public employer must carefully determine
whether a class of employees is covered by the legislation when that
employer seeks to alter the wages, hours, and working conditions.
When an employee comes under the public sector bargaining legisla-
4. Eg., Massachusetts Probation Ass'n v. Commissioner of Administration, 370 Mass. 651,
352 N.E.2d 684 (1976) (probation officers appointed judges).
5. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey v. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n, 65 A.D.2d
495, 411 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1973).
6. Lane Council of Gov'ts v. Lane Council of Gov't Employees Ass'n, 26 Or. App. 119, 552
P.2d 600 (1976), rev'd, 277 Or. 631, 561 P.2d 1012 (1977).
7. Murphy v. Mack, 358 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1978).
8. Independent School Dist. No. 621 v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 268 N.W.2d 410
(Minn. 1978).
9. New York Pub. Library v. Public Employees Relations Bd., 37 N.Y.2d 752, 374 N.Y.S.2d
625, 337 N.E.2d 136 (1975).
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tion, the employer may no longer be able to enter into individual con-
tracts with the employee concerning wages, hours, and working
conditions.' 0 When these matters involve mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining, I" making changes in them with regard to unionized public em-
ployees may force the employer to bargain.
WHEN THE BUDGET RUNS OUT--OR DID IT?
Public employers faced with a taxpayers' revolt or a possible bank-
ruptcy share an obvious problem: They are short of money to fund the
wages and fringe benefits contracted for or demanded by the public
employees. The real question, however, may be: Is the public em-
ployer really at the stage of financial inability, or is the public employer
merely anticipating a future deficit or potential complaint by taxpay-
ers? The answer is not always obvious.
Burden of Proof
An initial issue to be resolved is the allocation of the burden of
proof of proving financial inability to pay. The public employer, the
public employee union, or the interest arbitration panel' 2 are the possi-
ble candidates. 13 The union is an unlikely choice because it lacks direct
access to the basic information' 4 and lacks the legislative authority to
raise or lower revenue. In addition, giving the power of determination
to the union might itself involve an unlawful invasion of a management
prerogative. ' 5
In an impasse situation, where the public employer claims
10. Leechburg Area School Dist. v. Leechburg Educ. Ass'n, 475 Pa. 413, 380 A.2d 1203
(1977); Woodstock High School Bd. of Directors v. Woodstock Union High School Teachers'
Organization, 388 A.2d 392 (Vt. 1978).
11. See note 119 infra and accompanying text.
12. In the public sector, it is not uncommon to use interest arbitration to resolve a bargaining
impasse. The interest arbitrator or panel must decide the final terms of the contract. The financial
package commonly is among the issues in arbitration. For a statutory example of interest arbitra-
tion, see OR. REV. STAT. § 243.742 - 243.762 (1973).
13. The public labor board might be another candidate. For example, the public labor board
might find improper use of the ability to pay argument to be a violation of employer's duty to
bargain in good faith on a salary issue, and, as a remedy, order merit salary increases. Such a
remedy would be valid only if there was statutory authority. For a case where there was no
statutory authority, see Jefferson County Bd. of Supervisors v. Public Employment Relations Bd.,
36 N.Y.2d 534, 369 N.Y.S.2d 662, 330 N.E.2d 621 (1975).
14. In Caso v. Coffey, 41 N.Y.2d 153, 391 N.Y.S.2d 88, 359 N.E.2d 683 (1976), the court
rejected the argument that the employer's last best offer should be presumed to be a good faith
statement shifting the burden to the union.
15. For examples of statutorily defined management prerogatives, see R. SMITH, H. ED-
WARDS & R. CLARK, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 425-64 (1974). A contract
that allocates income between a school district deficit and wages is void as being against public
policy. Weary v. Board of Educ., 46 Ill. App. 3d 182, 360 N.E.2d 1112 (1977).
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financial inability and the union disagrees, some effort has been made
to shift the burden to the interest arbitrator, where the arbitration de-
vice is used. Under such a rule, the interest arbitrator would, in effect,
have to identify the source of funding in order to justify a costly ruling
in the union's favor on wages and working conditions. The rulings ap-
pear, however, to be to the contrary. The arbitrator may be required to
consider ability to pay, t6 but not prove its presence or absence. 17 The
burden of proof of financial inability lies on the public employer 18 and
not on the interest arbitrator.' 9 If the interest arbitration award upsets
the employer's planned budget, it is up to the employer to rejuggle pri-
orities, cut services, or seek additional revenue. 20 In other words, abil-
ity to pay is not determined by the line item entry dedicated to wages,
but rather, is concerned with the overall state of finances. Where the
interest arbitration award is valid, the public employer may have to
rejuggle the budget to fit the award into the overall picture. The one
with the management prerogative must manage.
A finding of inability to pay or financial crisis might also be de-
clared by a legislative body in the passage of special legislation. This
declaration will help to determine whether or not inability to pay exists,
but it need not be conclusive. The declaration of financial crisis in the
New York state legislation concerning New York City was sufficiently
16. Eg., OR. REV. STAT. § 243.746(4)(c) (1977); but see Nebraska City Educ. Ass'n v. School
Dist., 201 Nebr. 303, 267 N.W.2d 530 (1978) (ability to pay not considered because not in statute).
For arbitration statements on ability to pay, see, e.g., City of Council Bluffs v. AFSCME Local
2844, 70 Lab. Arb. 1258 (1978) (Winton, Arb.); Wayne County Labor Relations Bd. v. Wayne
County Sheriffs Local 502, 66 Lab. Arb. 460 (1976) (Roumell, Arb.); Berkowitz, Arbitration of
Public-Sector Interest Disputes- Economics, Politics, and Equity, in ARBITRATION-1976 PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRA-
TORS 159 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Berkowitz].
17. While not having to prove its actual existence, the arbitrator's decision, including consid-
eration of ability to pay, must be reasonable. See, e.g., City of Buffalo v. Rinaldo, 41 N.Y.2d 764,
396 N.Y.S.2d 152, 364 N.E.2d 817 (1977); Caso v. Coffey, 41 N.Y.2d 153, 391 N.Y.S.2d 88, 359
N.E.2d 683 (1976).
18. New Jersey State Policemen's Benev. Ass'n Local 16 v. City of East Orange, 164 N.J. 436,
396 A.2d 1158 (1978); City of Newburgh v. New York & Patrolmen's Benev. Ass'n of Newburgh,
67 Lab. Arb. 559, 561 (1976) (Miller, Arb.). But see Boston Teachers Union Local 66 v. School
Comm., 76 Mass. Adv. Sh. 155, 350 N.E.2d 707 (1976). The burden was put on the person seeking
to "recover" from the municipality (i e., the arbitrator), but after an initial finding, the burden of
going forward shifted to the public employer and was not met.
19. Where both the union and the employer asked the arbitration panel to audit the books
and find the money, the panel rejected the offer, citing its own lack of authority and the obliga-
tions of elected officials. City of Rialto v. Rialto Fire & Police Protection League, 67 Lab. Arb.
654 (1976) (Gentile, Arb.).
20. Fitchburg Teachers Ass'n v. School Dist., 360 Mass. 105, 271 N.E.2d 646 (1971); Roches-
ter City School Dist. v. Rochester Teachers Ass'n, 41 N.Y.2d 578, 394 N.Y.S.2d 179, 362 N.E.2d
977 (1977); AFSCME Local 2841 v. City of Albany, 55 App. Div. 2d 346, 390 N.Y.S.2d 475
(1977).
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compelling on the facts.21 Reliance on the legislative declaration of
financial emergency in California, however, was not sufficient. The
state supreme court looked at the state's surplus funds which the legis-
lation used to bail out local government. They determined that factu-
ally there was no crisis which would allow the resultant contract
impairment. 22 The determination of financial crisis can be important
to the public employer. Where a financial crisis is proved to exist, the
public employer may be entitled to take drastic action vis-A-vis the
public employees and the contract. 23 Where no crisis exists, the em-
ployer must live by the standard rules of contract interpretation.
In summary, the burden of proof of the inability to pay lies on the
public employer, and not the union or the impasse arbitrator. Legisla-
tive declarations may or may not be conclusive. Inability to pay is
based upon a consideration of the employer's entire financial picture,
and not merely on what the public employer has designated for wages
and fringe benefits.
Evidence of Inability to Pay
Where interest arbitration has been substituted for the strike and
the negotiators have come to impasse, the interest arbitrator, as re-
viewed by the court, may need to determine what constitutes sufficient
evidence of inability to pay.24 Documenting the case of inability from
the employer's point of view, and the absence of inability as perceived
by the union, requires careful, detailed work.25 Among the particular
types of evidence which might be considered are the following:
Budget priorities of the community, budget limitation in effect by
statute, the total budget in prior years, amount of budget which is the
result of property tax levies, the equalized tax rate in the community
compared to that in other communities, any financial liability the
community may have to accommodate as the result of pending litiga-
tion, the median family income compared to that of other communi-
21. Subway-Surface Supervisors Ass'n v. New York City Transit Auth., 44 N.Y.2d 101, 404
N.Y.S.2d 323, 375 N.E.2d 384 (1978).
22. Sonoma County Organization of Pub. Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296,
152 Cal. Rptr. 903, 591 P.2d 1 (1979).
23. See notes 42-44 infra and accompanying text.
24. The public labor board might also determine this issue on the question of whether the
employer's claim was made in good faith. See generally C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW 312-14 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as MORRIS].
25. See generally Berkowitz supra note 16; Mulcahy, Ability to Pay. The Public Employee
Dilemma, 31 ARB. J. 90 (1976); Problems ofArbitrating Public Sector Impasses are Considered,
[1977] 733 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 10; Lack of MoneyAffects Labor Relations in Both US4
and Canada, Conferees Told, [1976] 673 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-I; Impact of Cities'
Financial Condition on Public Sector Bargaining Dominates FMCS-NCSL Conference, [19761 651
GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-16.
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ties and its ability to absorb a new tax increase, outline of the amount
available in the budget for increases for a particular bargaining unit,
any revenues lost to the community having a significant impact on
the budget, the community's debt level and total amount of debt
service it pays, amount of increases allotted to other groups in the
community, level of benefits for other employees and structure of
their contracts, and reduction in services which would result from the
union's final offer.
26
Other types of useful evidence might include the amount of tax delin-
quencies, family income of taxpayers, per capita assessed value, retail
sales level, home sales level, general state of the overall economy and
the local economy, welfare obligations of the unit of government, par-
ticularly in light of any pending recessions, and rating of government
securities in the market.27 Such presentations by both sides should be
made in the utmost good faith.28
A number of items, taken alone, will not demonstrate financial in-
ability.29 Increased public criticism of government expenditures, com-
bined with finding a less expensive alternative, will not justify public
employer actions based on financial inability when there is an existing
contract. 30 Incomplete financial information combined with a fear of
future deficit are inadequate proof.3' A general slowdown in the econ-
omy, e.g., lessened building activity, may not be enough to demonstrate
an actual falloff in the public employers' specific business, e.g., building
valuations and permits.32 Where a contract calls for discretionary
fringe benefits such as sabbatical leaves based upon educational sound-
ness of proposal, the public employer cannot deny all requests regard-
26. Preparednessfor Organizing, Bargaining, and Striking Stressed at NA CO's Labor Confer-
ence, [1976] 656 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-14, B-17.
27. Nassau County Can Afford Pay Increases/or its Police Officers, Rules N. Y Court, [1976]
667 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-4.
28. Carrother, The Cuckoo's Egg in the Mare's Nest-Arbitration of Interest Disputes in Pub-
lic-Service Collective Bargaining- Problems of Principle, Policy and Process, in ARBITRATION-
1977, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF AR-
BITRATORS 15, 27 (1977).
29. Similarly, a union cannot overcome an allegation of financial inability by simply stating
that there are other means available to meet its demands. Subway-Surface Supervisors Ass'n v.
New York City Transit Auth., 44 N.Y.2d 101, 404 N.Y.S.2d 323, 375 N.E.2d 384 (1978). The
finding of a $100,000 error in the employer's calculations in a $4 million budget does not mean
that the employer has negotiated in bad faith on the question of financial ability. Dickinson Educ.
Ass'n v. Dickinson Pub. School Dist., 252 N.W.2d 205 (N.D. 1977).
30. MERC Orders County to Retain Hospital Firefighters During Contract Term, [1978] 775
GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 9 (Michigan Employment Relations Board).
31. Pasco County School Bd. v. Florida Pub. Empl. Rel. Comm., 353 So.2d 108 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977). See also Boston Teachers Local 66 v. School Comm., 76 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1515, 350
N.E.2d 707 (1976).
32. Metropolitan Dade County v. Dade County Employees Local Union, 66 Lab. Arb. 230
(1976) (Rimer, Arb.).
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less of merit on the grounds of financial exigency. 33 Where the public
employer takes action based upon financial exigency, such as layoff,
and it is later determined that there was no inability, the awards of
reinstatement and back pay can be very expensive.
34
The problem of priorities in a government budget is a difficult one.
A public employer will usually bargain with several units of public em-
ployees, resulting in several contracts. In addition to those contracts,
the employer may be making capital expenditures and incurring other
obligations. Campaign promises of elected officials may require addi-
tional funding. Each of these obligations cannot be given an equal pri-
ority claim on the available funds. The result is that the public
employer may have to underfund some activities in order to accom-
plish the priority goals that have been identified.
The attempted "underfunding" of the union demands on a labor
contract may result in a bargaining impasse. Where interest arbitration
is used to resolve the impasse, the interest arbitrator must redetermine
the character of priorities. This will involve a balancing of collective
bargaining aspirations with other governmental priorities. As one arbi-
trator stated:
Despite a tight budget the Fact Finder feels there is sufficient justifi-
cation for applying a relatively high priority to the matter of
wages. . . .[T]he effect non-competitive wages can have on the pres-
ent and future efficiency of the Commission's operation [cannot be
ignored]. If a reasonable wage parity ...cannot be maintained,
good employees may be hard to attract, and old employees may be
influenced to seek employment elsewhere. Either prospect would
make it more difficult for the Commission to meet its community
obligation.3
5
Financial ability and governmental priorities are but two of the factors
to be considered by the interest arbitrators. Other factors might include
past practices and contracts, comparisons with other similar public or
private sector employees, comparisons with others in similarly situated
geographical areas, and the public interest.36 One award on a wage
reopener took account of a forthcoming tax levy election and awarded
33. Board of Educ. v. Somers Faculty Ass'n, 48 App. Div. 2d 873, 369 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1975).
The public employer may have the contractual or statutory authority to deny all requests based on
the individual merit of each request, but the determination on merit must be distinguished from
denial based on financial exigency.
34. Chicago Teachers Awarded $2.8 Million for "Lay Off" on Last Day of 1977 Year, [1979]
808 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 13; Yonkers Begins Paying Award in "Fiscal Crisis" Case-
Some Financial Problems Elsewhere, 8 PUB. PERS. AD. 2 at 4.2 (1979) ($8 million involved).
35. Emmet County Road Comm. v. Teamsters Local 406, 62 Lab. Arb. 1310, 1312 (1974)
(Shaw, Arb.).
36. City of Council Bluffs v. AFSCME Local 2844, 70 Lab. Arb. 1258 (1978) (Winton, Arb.).
See also City of Kenosha v. Kenosha Professional Policemen's Ass'n, 63 Lab. Arb. 126 (1974)
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a seven percent increase if the levy passed and four percent increase if
the levy did not pass.
37
Despite its importance in a revolt or crisis situation, it seems un-
likely that financial ability will become the sole criterion for the interest
arbitrator or the courts reviewing the award in the near future. The
New York City financial exigency legislation was recently amended to
take account of the experience gained to date. Financial ability was
given greater emphasis, but was not made the sole determinative. Fi-
nancial ability must be considered and given substantial weight: Fi-
nancial ability is defined as "the financial ability of the City. . . to pay
the cost of any increase . . . without requiring an increase in the level
of City taxes existing at the time of the commencement [of the impasse
proceedings]. ' 38 As was indicated in a related case,39 it appears likely
that the priority given to a particular contract must still be considered
in relationship to other demands on municipal revenues.
In summary, proof of inability to pay by the public employer and
rebuttal evidence by the union ranges from evidence on the state of the
general economy to particularized information on the community. The
determination by the impasse arbitrator that the public employer has
the ability to pay may require the public employer to rejuggle the
budgetary priorities.
When the Budget Is Exhausted
Once it is demonstrated that a true fiscal crisis has arisen, drastic
action may be needed to preserve the public employer as a functioning
arm of government. 4° The drastic action may include layoff, shortened
work week, hiring and wage freezes, or changes in fringe benefits, any
or all of which may violate a collective bargaining agreement or statu-
tory right. The labor agreement will not be permitted to become a "sui-
cide pact."' 4 ' Despite a constitutional prohibition against the
(Rouch, Arb.); City of Buffalo v. Rinaldo, 41 N.Y.2d 764, 396 N.Y.S.2d 152, 364 N.E.2d 817
(1977).
37. Arbitration Briefs, 8 PUB. PERS. AD. 7 at 19.19 (1977). This might, however, literally be a
case of "passing the buck."
38. DeMila v. New York, 100 L.R.R.M. 2625 (1978) (upholding the constitutional validity of
the amendment).
39. City of Buffalo v. Rinaldo, 41 N.Y.2d 764, 396 N.Y.S.2d 152, 364 N.E.2d 817 (1977).
40. In order to avoid financial problems, a court may reform a contract erroneously contain-
ing an enlarged benefit. Reformation may occur even where the arbitrators must select between
final offers. Michigan Court Permits Re-formation of Contract, [1978] 758 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP.
20.
41. Board of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657, 353
N.E.2d 569 (1976).
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impairment of contracts, the question for most courts "concerns not
whether the state may in some cases impair the obligation of contracts,
but the circumstances under which such impairment is permissible.
'42
Such circumstances might include fiscal as well as non-fiscal reasons,
but our focus here is on fiscal reasons. 43
The California Supreme Court enumerated the following criteria
to be met before contract impairment can be permitted:
1. Finding of emergency adequately documented.
2. Impairment for the protection of a basic general interest of soci-
ety, not for the advantage of a particular group.
3. Reasonably related to emergency and conditions imposed by
emergency, i.e., delay rather than destroy contract rights.
4. Legislative impairment is temporary and limited to exigency
which provoked the legislative response-temporary and limited,
not severe and permanent.44
Using essentially these types of considerations, the New York City
wage freeze legislation was found to be valid. The New York court
found the existence of a true fiscal crisis, a sufficiently equal sharing of
the burden between collective bargaining units, a reasonable relation-
ship between the problem and the proposed actions, and a limited, tem-
porary suspension of contract rights as contrasted with a total loss.
45
42. Sonoma County Organization of Pub. Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296,
305, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903, 907, 591 P.2d 1, 5 (1979).
43. For recent non-fiscal reasons, see Porcelli v. Titus, 108 N.J. Supr. 301, 261 A.2d 364
(1969) (promotion policy overridden by need to transfer black staff members which was not per-
mitted by terms of agreement); War, Insurrection, End Contractual Obligation, [ 1977] 716 GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. 11 (contract terminated without severance by University of Hawaii for field work
project to be conducted in Laos; Communist takeover of Laos before contract completed).
44. Sonoma County Organization of Pub. Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296,
305-06, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903, 907, 591 P.2d 1, 5 (1979). The New York court recognized these
factors: "But the collective agreement in question, negotiated before a legislatively declared emer-
gency, short-term in length, and indistinguishable from the city's other contractual obligations
which remain enforceable, is not yet vulnerable to attack as in violation of public policy." Board
of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 276, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657, 661, 353 N.E.2d
569, 573 (1976). An arbitrator in New York identified useful criteria to determine whether a fiscal
crisis layoff was valid. The arbitrator would find it to be a subterfuge if the city:
a. Was not faced with a genuine city-wide fiscal crisis;
b. Had falsified a fiscal crisis or represented that it was confronted with a fiscal crisis
when it was not;
c. Was confronted with a genuine fiscal crisis but a reduction in the manning of fire
companies was not necessary to meet it;
d. Faced a genuine fiscal crisis but the Fire Department was required to bear the brunt
of layoffs and manning reductions unreasonably disproportionate to what was re-
quired of other bargaining units;
e. Failed to reactivate the minimum manning schedule which had been deactivated by
the fiscal crisis, when the crisis abated to the extent that fire fighters were recalled
• ..provided the funds or law under which they were returned to work did not
legally restrict their use to restore manning levels.
City of New York Fire Dept. v. Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, 66 Lab. Arb. 261, 262 (1976)
(Schmertz, Arb.).
45. Subway-Surface Supervisors Ass'n v. New York City Transit Auth., 44 N.Y.2d 101, 404
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The California court, on the other hand, found no true emergency, but
a permanent and significant destruction of the contractual rights that
went to the heart of the contract.46 The legislative wage freeze was
determined in California to be an unlawful impairment of the collec-
tive bargaining contracts.
One major point in controversy between New York and California
was whether the contractual (or statutory)47 rights had "vested." Vest-
ing is concerned with whether the employees lost their pay increase,
calculated on the basis of services already performed in the past, or lost
an expectancy based on services to be performed in the future. Gener-
ally speaking, vested contractual employee rights cannot be abrogated
by subsequent legislative action.48 The New York legislation was care-
fully drafted to avoid several possible pitfalls in the "vesting" argu-
ment. The legislation did not terminate existing employment, nor
deprive employees of payments for services rendered in the past, nor
alter regular payments into the statutory pension fund.49 The New
York court had to interpret the legislation and contract in such a way
as to avoid finding a vested right in the current employees in the provi-
sions for future wage increases. The New York court said there was no
consideration for the expectation of future wage increases, hence its
extinguishment did not invade a "right." The California court, without
actually deciding, doubted the validity of the New York position.50
The New York position on vested rights in future wage increases is
followed in Delaware. The Delaware court found such legislation pro-
spective in design and operation, and found nothing in the future
promise of wage increases to induce employees to enter or remain in
public employment.5
The California position is consistent with that of Montana, where
the court considered the rights to be vested in current employees, and
N.Y.S.2d 323, 375 N.E.2d 384 (1978); Committee of Interns & Residents v. City of New York, 87
Misc. 2d 504, 386 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1976).
46. Sonoma County Organization of Pub. Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296,
152 Cal. Rptr. 903, 591 P.2d 1 (1979).
47. In a collective bargaining situation, contract rights might be sought to be terminated by
subsequent legislation or refusal to act on the contract. In non-collective bargaining situations,
cost of living or other types of pay increase legislation might be sought to be repealed by subse-
quent legislation.
48. Grant v. Nellius, 377 A.2d 354 (Del. 1977); Labor Rel. Comm'n v. Board of Selectmen,
78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 657, 373 N.E.2d 1165 (1978).
49. Subway-Surface Supervisors Ass'n v. New York City Transit Auth., 44 N.Y.2d 101, 404
N.Y.S.2d 323, 375 N.E.2d 384 (1978).
50. Sonoma County Organization of Pub. Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296,
152 Cal. Rptr. 903, 591 P.2d 1 (1979).
51. Grant v. Nellius, 377 A.2d 354, 357-58 (Del. 1977).
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specifically found that longevity pay increases, for example, do induce
public employees to serve longer.52 Such an inducement would mean
the rights to future longevity increases have vested as to current em-
ployees.5 3 The argument concerning the vested character of future
promises of pay increases is important in several respects. For exam-
ple, fiscal constraints may be imposed by legislation. Such legislation
should be carefully drafted to avoid as many of the vesting arguments
as possible. Distinctions may have to be made in pensions, wages, and
other fringe benefits.
The true fiscal crisis is still rare and difficult to prove. Where the
existence of a crisis is problematic, it seems likely that the courts will
permit only minor impairment, if any. The major type of impairment
of contract, such as in New York, will be permitted only where the
crisis is bona fide and actual. The vesting argument again reminds the
union and employer that there are different classes of employees who
may have to be treated differently. 54 "Across-the-board" employer ac-
tions against public employees are likely to be more suspect than differ-
ential treatment. Similarly, unions may be less successful in bargaining
across-the-board gains in times of stress than in attempting more spe-
cialized bargaining. The union may achieve more by attempting to
hold existing benefits for current employees, and bargain different
rights for future employees.55
Some collective bargaining legislation provides for the reopening
of the contract in the event of employer inability to perform. 56 Presum-
ably, a unilateral declaration of inability would not be effective to trig-
ger the operation of the clause. The evidence of financial inability in
the constitutional sense will probably be required, unless the parties
52. Fire Fighters Local 8 v. City of Great Falls, 1977-78 PBC 36,118 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1977).
Massachusetts may also follow this rule, see Labor Relations Comm'n v. Board of Selectmen, 78
Mass. Adv. Sh. 657, 373 N.E.2d 1165 (1978).
53. Vested rights would presumably remain with the employees as long as they retained their
positions. The effect of repealing the rights-giving legislation of contract would mean that those
rights could not vest in employees subsequently hired. On this basis, the higher the rate of em-
ployee turnover, the more money would be saved by the public employer after the repealing legis-
lation.
54. See notes 47-53 supra.
55. This may raise questions concerning the union's duty of fair representation, see MORRIS,
supra note 24, at 343-46. However, where a true fiscal crisis exists, the union is likely to have
greater flexibility than in normal circumstances.
56. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
In the event any provision of a collective bargaining agreement is declared to be invalid
by any court . . . or by inability of the employer . . . to perform to the terms of the
agreement, then upon request by either party allor any part of the entire collective bar-
gaining agreement shall be reopened for negotiation.
OR. REV. STAT. § 243.702(1) (1975).
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have bargained a lesser standard. Under such a statute, a clause cover-
ing inability would probably be found to be a mandatory subject of
bargaining.
In summary, when a budget crisis exists, the public employer may
not be bound by the constitutional limitations on the impairment of
contracts. The finding of a budgetary crisis requires a finding of the
social interest and the use of reasonable measures no more destructive
of the contract than necessary. Constitutional protection arises when
the contract rights have vested. Courts have split on whether promises
of future wage increases have vested.
The Layoff
The public employee receives many monetary benefits, including
such items as present wages, future increases, longevity pay, severance
pay, pension rights, health-medical-dental-legal, and other fringe bene-
fit payments. When the financial crisis arises, each of these may be
affected in a particular way and each would require separate ahalysis.
However, the most dramatic effect of the budget crisis is the layoff or
wholesale termination of jobs. Layoff issues range from constitutional
questions of due process 57 to interpretation of the terms of applicable
contract.
The basic doctrine applicable where the public employer seeks to
take unilateral action involves the duty to bargain in good faith.
Where the enabling statute requires bargaining on a matter, the deci-
sion must be made bilaterally (ie., bargained) rather than unilaterally
(ie., employer alone decides). When a matter is not subject to bargain-
ing, such as those which fall under managerial prerogative, it is gener-
ally not subject to resolution by the impasse arbitrator. A true
emergency expands managerial prerogative and reduces the duty to
bargain.
Attempts to contractually prohibit layoffs have not been successful
in the true emergency situation. "The policy of protecting contracts
against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by
virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile .... "58 The ulti-
57. Due process is not a major topic of this article. In passing, it is noted that due process is a
relative concept, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), of uncertain application, Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), and of even greater uncertainty in times of emergency, Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
58. DeLury v. City of New York, 2 PBC 20,207 at 20,682 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
See also Schwab v. Bowen, 51 App. Div. 2d 574, 379 N.Y.S.2d 111, aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 907, 394
N.Y.S.2d 616, 363 N.E.2d 341 (1977).
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mate power of the public employer to layoff in a crisis seems relatively
clear, but its exercise must follow the dictates of good faith as well as
any statutory or contractual limitations.5 9 The layoff must be genuine,
and not a subterfuge.60 Where the crisis is less evident and the contract
is of reasonable duration, a public employer might be limited by the
terms of a voluntary collective bargaining agreement giving greater
protection to the employee's job security than to the employer's right to
layoff.6' Where layoff is not a mandatory subject of bargaining and
where the employer has not voluntarily bargained the matter, the deci-
sion to layoff may be unilaterally made, but the employer may be re-
quired to bargain about such effects of the terminations62 as timing of
layoffs, number and identity of employees to be laid off, workload and
safety of those remaining, and minimum manning. The employer can-
not use the layoff merely to avoid existing responsibilities when a less
expensive alternative comes along.
63
Use of the layoff will result in an immediate reduction in the pub-
lic employer's budget in a crisis situation. If an immediate crisis is not
involved, but long term budget stabilization or reduction is needed, at-
trition 64 and nonreplacement will generally provide significant relief.
65
Attrition affects the makeup of the employer's workforce in nonselec-
tive ways, thus affording the employer less control of the makeup; how-
59. Village of Cool Grove v. AFSCME Sub-Local 771, 67 Lab. Arb. 699 (1976) (McIntosh,
Arb.); Board of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657, 353
N.E.2d 569 (1976); City of Brookfield v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 87 Wis. 2d
819, 275 N.W.2d 723 (1979); Assistant Secretary Overturns AL.f's Finding of Unfair Practice, [1978]
757 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. 5.
60. For the layoff to be proper. . . it must be inspired by an acceptable Industrial Rela-
tions motive and the following conditions must be observed: (1) the work must be aban-
doned by the County; (2) the work must not be contracted out; (3) the work must not be
performed by non-unit personnel.
Genesee Co. Sheriffs Dep't v. Teamsters Local 214, 66 Lab. Arb. 27 (1976) (Keefe, Arb.). But see
Bennett v. MacMillan, 2 PBC 20,424 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1975). The court in Young v. Board of
Educ., 35 N.Y.2d 31, 34, 358 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711, 315 N.E.2d 768, 769 (1974), observed: "Had a
new or part-time position been created to carry on the work formerly done by petitioner, a differ-
ent question would be presented... "
61. Board of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657, 353
N.E.2d 509 (1976); Susquehanna Valley Control School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers'
Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d 614, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427, 339 N.E.2d 132 (1975).
62. Fire Fighters Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507, 526 P.2d
971 (1974); City of Brookfield v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 87 Wis. 2d 819, 833,
275 N.W.2d 723, 730 (1979).
63. Sonoma County Organization v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903,
591 P.2d 1 (1979); Wheatley v. City of Covington, 2 PBC 20,283 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1972).
64. Attrition occurs when employees leave employment for reasons of retirement, finding
jobs elsewhere, death, leaving the workforce, etc. Nonreplacement of those employees results in a
reduction of the employer's workforce.
65. Smardon, Productivity in the Public Sector, I PuB. PERS. AD. 3275 (1977); PH/IPMAf
Survey Report." The Fiscal Crisis-Its Effects, I PUB. PERS. AD. 3249 (1976).
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ever, it may reduce the amount of litigation that would result from the
use of the layoff. Where layoff is used, protective clauses for the termi-
nated employees may be required by statute66 or reached through ne-
gotiations. 67  Such provisions may include early notice, layoff by
seniority, limited preferential recall list, or limited continuance of
health benefits. There is also increasing recognition of the role of the
strike as a device, legitimate or otherwise, for effecting a reduction in
personnel costs. 68 The effect is immediate, but the timing will depend,
in part, on the expiration date of the contract.
Another element to be considered in the context of the fiscally-
inspired layoff is the role of the CETA69 worker funded by the federal
government.70 Under the new rules applicable to the CETA pro-
gram, 7' the role of the CETA worker is unclear. The relatively shorter
period of time for federal financial assistance may convert a CETA
worker into a temporary class of employees not covered by public sec-
tor collective bargaining legislation. 72
A number of interesting defenses have been utilized in attempts to
forestall a layoff. Efforts to require an environmental impact statement
before a layoff have been rejected, largely because the primary impact
of a layoff is not on the physical environment. 73 On the other hand, the
provisions of a "sunshine law" have been successfully invoked in a lay-
off situation, drawing a distinction between individual personnel deci-
66. E.g., Young v. Board of Educ., 35 N.Y.2d 31, 358 N.Y.S.2d 709, 315 N.E.2d 768 (1974)
(interpreting New York law).
67. See Detailed Layoff Provisions Written Into USPS Agreement, [1979] 802 GOV'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) 6.
68. FBA-BNA Conference Panel Discusses Recent Developments in Public Sector Bargaining,
[1976] 684 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-9. If a strike results from the deliberate actions of
the employer in a negotiating impasse situation, the employer may have violated the common
requirement of good faith bargaining. See generally MORRIS, supra note 24, at 277.
69. Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-203, 87 Stat. 839
(1973).
70. CETA regulations state that no financial assistance can be provided that would result in
the displacement of regularly employed workers, impair existing contracts, or result in the substi-
tution of federal for other funds. This has led to the discharge of CETA workers along with
regular workers in California. See U.S. Appeals Court Affirms CETA Firing Case Dismissal, [19791
799 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 12. See also City of Tiffin v. AFSCME Local 583, 69 Lab.
Arb. 1154 (1977) (Cummins, Arb.); Genesee Co. Sheriffs Dep't v. Teamsters Local 214, 66 Lab.
Arb. 27 (1976) (Keefe, Arb.).
71. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 821(a), 829(b), 873(c)(1), 873(d), 873(e), 879(g), 882, 914(a)(i), 952(a)
(1979).
72. CETA Employees Excludedfrom Unit (Florida), 8 PUB. PERS. AD. 6 (1979).
73. No Environmental Study Necessary Before RIF Appeals Court Says, [1978] 755 GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 7; Lack of Environmental Impact Statement Held No Bar to Closing of
Army Arsenal, [1976] 673 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) A-8; Environmental Impact Statement
Not Neededin Army Depot Cutback, Sixth Circuit Says, [1976] 669 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA)
A-3. See also Court L!is Injunction Blocking Navy Office Move to Mississippi, [1976] 655 GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) A-8.
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sions, which are nonpublic, and large scale personnel actions, which
are subject to the open meeting requirements of the sunshine provi-
sions.74 In some situations, state law may mandate that certain services
be provided, such as school nurses or librarians. Despite union argu-
ments, these provisions do not necessarily preserve jobs; the court may
distinguish between the particular service provided by the discharged
employee and the continuation of the service in some other manner by
the public employer.75 In some situations, layoffs may be required by a
seniority clause in the contract. For example, where the employer must
reduce personnel expenditures, this result could also be achieved by
reducing the workweek for the entire workforce or by discharging a
portion of the workforce and requiring the remainder to continue
working full time. The workweek reduction treats all employees
equally, while the termination approach gives recognition to the senior-
ity provisions of the contract. A sufficiently explicit seniority provision
may require the public employer to use the termination approach in
order to avoid a violation of the intent of the contract.
76
In summary, the public employer's right to layoff in a financial
crisis, regardless of the contract terms, seems well-established. In non-
public situations, layoff or the effect of layoff might be a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Protective clauses concerning layoff may be
found in some statutes or contracts. Union efforts to prevent layoffs
through the use of other legislation, such as sunshine laws, have not
generally succeeded. The seniority clause is critical in determining
whether layoff or a workweek reduction can be used.
LEGISLATION AND BUDGETS
To date, the phenomenon of financial crisis or taxpayer revolt has
primarily been felt by agencies at the local government level. These
local agencies have been the focus of relief efforts by federal and state
level agencies, which may provide loans and other forms of financial
aid. With the money come control and supervision over its use, which
cause added complications in the collective bargaining process. In
74. School Layoff Decisions Subject to Missouri Sunshine Law, 8 PUB. PERS. AD. I at 8.1
(1978). However, the remedy was held to be discretionary and reinstatement was not ordered.
75. The distinction may be less than completely clear and raises the question of whether the
employer has reduced personnel through discharge or substituted another to continue the service.
Campbell Elementary Teachers' Ass'n v. Abbott, 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 143 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1978).
76. Mahoning County Engineer v. Teamsters Local 377, 70 Lab. Arb. 895 (1978) (Cohen,
Arb.). See also Metropolitan Dade County v. AFSCME Local 1363, 66 Lab. Arb. 230 (1976)
(Rimer, Arb.); City of Beloit v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 242
N.W.2d 231 (1975).
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New York, for example, the Emergency Financial Control Board can
reject or alter a contract the parties have negotiated. 77 California legis-
lation sought to impose a local government wage freeze. 78 The United
States Secretary of the Treasury and the Congress can use the threat of
withholding federal loans where the proposed contract contains clauses
which they oppose.79 Bargaining in this context becomes, in effect,
more than bilateral. Both sides will be trying to convince bureaucracies
other than the public employer that their position is the most "just."
There are a number of other direct and indirect effects on the col:
lective bargaining process. The importance of bargaining monetary is-
sues may be decreased in the face of wage freezes. Trade-offs are lost
and other issues assume greater importance. The union may focus its
attention on increased lobbying in the appropriate legislative arena
rather than on bargaining at the table. Supervisory agencies must be
convinced that the proposed contract is appropriate.
The use of federal money carries with it the potential for one of
the two parties-public employer or employees-to substantially alter
the balance of power. Contract approval is obviously one example.
The real potential, however, lies in the terms of the enabling legislation
under which the funds are made available.80 A statute in point, al-
though not a "bail out" statute, is the Urban Mass Transportation Act.
The act provides, in part:
It shall be a condition of any assistance under section 1602 of
this title that fair and equitable arrangements are made, as deter-
mined by the Secretary of Labor, to protect the interests of employ-
ees affected by such assistance. Such protective arrangements shall
include, without being limited to, such provisions as may be necessary
for (1) the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits (including
continuation of pension rights and benefits) under existing collective
bargaining agreements or otherwise; (2) the continuation of collective
bargaining rights; (3) the protection of individual employees against
a worsening of their positions with respect to their employment; (4)
assurances of employment to employees of acquired mass transporta-
tion systems and priority of reemployment of employees terminated
77. Address by Robert Helsby, Has Government Pre-empted Collective Bargaining?, Society
of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (October 25, 1976),printedin [1976] 681 GOV'T EMPL. REL.
REP. (BNA) F-I. See also Weitzman, The Effect ofEconomic Restraints on Public-Sector Collective
Bargaining: The Lessons of New York City, 2 EMPL. REL. L.J. 286 (1977) [hereinafter referred to
as Weitzman]; ALMA Conference Views Public Employment Impasse Resolution, [1977] GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 34; Adversarial Factor, Government Pre-Emption, Arbitral Challenges, New
Dimensions Stressed at SPIDR Meeting, [1976] 681 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-10.
78. Sonoma County Organization of Pub. Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296,
152 Cal. Rptr. 903, 591 P.2d 1 (1979).
79. Weitzman, supra note 77, at 293.
80. The CETA employee may be another example. See note 70 supra.
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or laid off; and (5) paid training or retraining programs. Such ar-
rangements shall include provisions protecting individual employees
against a worsening of their positions with respect to their employ-
ment which shall in no event provide benefits less than those estab-
lished pursuant to section 5(2)(f) of this title. The contract for the
granting of any such assistance shall specify the terms and conditions of
the protective arrangements.
8 1
Under the legislation, local communities may obtain federal
money for the purchase of privately owned mass transportation prop-
erty or facilities. The local community may or may not seek the federal
money. If a voluntary request is made, however, use of the money is
conditioned as set out above. Usually, when a public employer buys
out a private employer, the employees would become public employees
subject to whatever rights or lack of rights other public employees in
that area are given. Under this legislation, the new public employees
have, in addition, those rights provided by the protective agreement as
determined by the United States Secretary of Labor. To date, the legis-
lation has been held valid.82 Where the protective agreement contains
rights, such as interest arbitration, which are contrary to the general
law or policy of the state, the terms of the protective agreement still
must be maintained.
83
Both public employers and public unions might find federal or
state legislation a profitable route to attempt to travel to reach their
respective goals. The legislation that surrounds a fiscal crisis or a tax-
payers' revolt might offer additional opportunities to reach these goals.
By the same token, such crisis or revolt legislation might have the effect
of rendering collective bargaining meaningless. It should be recalled
that the New York legislation provided that the act should not be con-
strued to impair the right of employees to organize or bargain collec-
tively.84 Despite language of this type, there will be an impact on the
bargaining process. The question is whether the impact will be directed
or inadvertent.
81. 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
82. City of Macon v. Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 1209, 1223 (M.D. Ga. 1977). See also Thomas
& Wright, Busman's Holiday-Labor's Right Under the Urban Mass Transportation Act, I PUB.
PERS. AD. 3179 (1978).
83. Local Div. 519 Transit Union v. LaCrosse Transit Utility, 585 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1978);
Local Div. 1287 Transit Union v. Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 582 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 872 (1979). In Transit Union Local 714, the collective agreement did not call
for interest arbitration, but the section 13(c) protective agreement did call for interest arbitration.
The court concluded the interest arbitration provision was enforceable in the federal courts. Local
Div. 714 Transit Union v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 1979-80 PBC 136,466 (lst Cir. 1978).
84. How No Money and New Power Centers are Changing NYC's Public Bargaining, [1976]
666 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-9.
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In summary, "bailing out" financially pressed local government or
offering more conventional loans or grants to local government re-
quires state or federal legislation authorizing the use of funds and de-
termining the conditions under which the funds may be used. Either
the public employer or the union can dramatically alter the balance of
power relationship if they can affect the terms of the enabling legisla-
tion. Legislation can require third party contract approval, extend new
rights to employees, and the like.
CLAUSES IN THE CONTRACT AND BUDGETS
The public sector contract is written to last one or more years into
the future. The state of the national and local economies, as well as the
state of mind of the taxpayer, are sufficiently uncertain to virtually re-
quire that the parties to a collective agreement bargain with these un-
certainties in mind. Both the employer and the union want contract
clauses which will help protect their respective interests in the event of
a crisis or revolt. An enormous number of clauses can be involved,
85
and the bargaining over each clause might involve one or more of sev-
eral approaches. Bargaining over a layoff clause, for example, might
involve notice of a decision already made, consultation before a deci-
sion is made, bargaining over the details of the actual layoff, bargaining
over the effect or impact of the layoff, or bargaining to preclude the
layoff. A common factor in most of these situations will be attempts to
meet the demands of the crisis or revolt with greater productivity, at the
same or lower cost than the present, in those areas of employment
which remain. The purpose of this section is to consider some aspects
of a few of the clauses that might be bargained in the contract. The
85. A partial list might include wage or hiring freeze, redirection of services or priorities with
resultant personnel actions, subcontracting, productivity, pensions, outside pay and jobs, job clas-
sification plans, salary schedules, shortened or lengthened work week, preparation or cleanup
time, lunch duties, accumulation of sick or personal leave, weather-related closures, time off to
process grievances, labor-management committees, early retirement, RIF, use of part-time person-
nel or volunteers, transfers, retraining, attrition, leaves without pay, recall, seniority, medical-
dental-optical-legal fringe benefits, impasse procedures, work-related discipline, strikes, cost of
living clauses, travel, and disability.
Some of the literature includes: NPEL?4 Meetings Focus in Employer Preparedness, Train-
ing, Cooperation, [1979] 801 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 9; Public Officials are Told to Control
Labor Costs, [1978] 763 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 10; AFT Provides Advice on Negotiating
Layoff Clauses, Organizing Paras., [1978] 758 GoV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 12; NPELRA Con-
ference ToldPublic Sector Not Basically Different from Private, [1977] 702 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP.
(BNA) 12; 4BA Institute on Public Sector Labor Law Focuses on Legislative Outlook, Impact of
Supreme Court Rulings, [1976] 685 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-7; Job Description Provisions
in FederalAgreement, I PUB. PERS. AD. 3233, 3122 (1977); PH/IPMA Survey Report.- The Fiscal
Crisis-Its Effects, 1 PuB. PEPs. AD. 3249, 3126 (1976); Note, Public Employee Pensions in Times
of Fiscal Distress, 90 HARV. L. REV. 992 (1977).
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selection of clauses reflects, to some extent, the amount of judicial and
arbitral attention the clauses have received.
Contracting Out
Subcontracting or contracting out public sector work to private
sector employers can be viewed from diametrically opposed points of
view. The employer may seek to contract out unit work based on bids
that appear to represent a considerable saving to the taxpayer. The
union may scorn contracting out as the payoff in the "new pa-
tronage." 86 Whatever the view, a significant amount of contracting out
occurs. To some extent, some of the issues of contracting out may be
beyond the control of the immediate parties. The character of the deci-
sion,87 legislation,88 or inter-departmental memos89 may set the guide-
lines on the decision. A particular example of legislation may be the
civil service laws of a state. Some of these laws may indicate a public
policy preference for public employees to do work customarily and his-
torically provided by civil servants, even if the public employer could
save by contracting out. 90
Cases in the public sector often rely upon the Fibreboard9' ration-
ale found in the private sector. Under that doctrine, the decision to
subcontract is a mandatory subject of bargaining where, among other
reasons, there is no basic alteration of operations, the matter does not
unduly abridge the employer's right to manage the business, there is no
86. Contracting Out is Cited as "New Patronage" in AFSCME Publication, [1977] 735 GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 23. The cited objections include lack of competitive bidding, breeding of
corruption of the public officials through payoff or kickback, waste, and inefficiency as the "sav-
ings" is often achieved by reduced services, a virtual monopoly by the first bid winner who makes
extensive capital outlays, and a lack of accountability of decision making is transferred to the
private employer.
87. Eg., Army's Decision to Contract Out is Unreviewable RIFFed Employees Lack Standing
to Sue, Court Says, [1976] 673 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) A-3. The "military" nature of the
decision was cited as the basis of the decision.
88. E.g., Public Employment Issues: 1978 Election Results, 7 PuB. PERS. AD. 1 (1978).
89. E.g., New Policy on Contracting Out Government Activities Issued, [1979] 805 GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 5; Key Excerptsfrom New Proposed OMB Policy on Government Reliance
on Private Enterprise (Circular A-76), [1977] 736 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 33.
90. Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. Spokane Community College, 90 Wash. 2d 698,
585 P.2d 474 (1978). A variation on the theme was the unsuccessful effort of RIFFed NASA
employees who claimed a right to bump the employees of a private contractor to NASA on the
grounds that the private employees should be declared to be civil servants under the control of
NASA. Appeals Court Overturns District Court on NASA Huntsville Contracts, [1978] 753 GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 9. New York law is violated where the subcontract employees are not
independent of the government. Westchester County Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Cimino, 58
A.D.2d 869, 396 N.Y.S.2d 692, 364 N.E.2d 1332 (1977), aff'dmem., 44 N.Y.2d 985, 408 N.Y.S.2d
501, 380 N.E.2d 327 (1978). See also Conlin v. Arello, 64 A.D.2d 921, 408 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1978).
91. Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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financial investment or recoupment, and it would promote peaceful set-
tlement. Thus, the decision to contract out of school bus operations
92
or school food service93 may require bargaining. In other jurisdictions,
bargaining over the effects of the decision may be all that is required.
94
Bargaining over the decision or the effects of the decision may not be
needed where it is permitted by an existing collective bargaining con-
tract.95 In one unusual case, a county accepted help, at no cost and
involving no layoffs, from the Army Corps to clear snow-clogged roads,
a job also done by unit employees. Despite the union's protest, no sub-
contract was found to exist. 96 However, where a school district termi-
nated paid teachers aides and replaced them with unpaid volunteers,
the court held that the matter was subject to mandatory bargaining.
97
It was treated as though there was an impermissible subcontract despite
the character of the replacements. Subcontracting might also raise
other issues. An otherwise valid subcontract for the purpose of avoid-
ing doing business with a union might amount to a coercive threat and
be considered an unfair labor practice during the organizational
stage.
98
Contracting out in some situations might pose a special danger for
some unwary public employers. Under the subcontract, the public em-
ployer contracts with a private employer who will provide a specified
service. The National Labor Relations Board99 does not have jurisdic-
tion over the public employer and public employees. °° Historically,
the NLRB would elect not to exert jurisdiction over private employers
who, by subcontract, had an "intimate connection" with the exempt
92. Van Buren Pub. School Dist. v. Wayne County Circuit Judge, 61 Mich. App. 6, 232
N.W.2d 278 (1975).
93. Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Wisconsin Employment Relation Comm'n, 81 Wis. 2d 89,
259 N.W.2d 724 (1977).
94. E.g., Labor Relations Highlights, 7 PuB. PERS. AD. (1978) (Connecticut State Board of
Labor Relations).
95. E.g., Public Employees v. City of Richmond, 98 L.R.R.M. 3206 (Calif. Ct. App. 1978);
Contracting-Outfor Special Transit Service No Violation, Arbiter Rules, [19781 775 Gov'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) 13 (Hondsaker, Arb.).
96. County Found Justified in Using Army Corps During 1978 Snowstorm, [1979] 804 GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 13.
97. Pennsylvania Labor Rel. Bd. v. Mars Area School Dist., 480 Pa. 295, 389 A.2d 1073
(1978).
98. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm. v. City of Evansville, 2 PBC 20,236 (Wis. Cir.
Ct. 1972); Contracting Out After Union Sought Pact Held ULP in VT, [1979] 798 GOV'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) 16.
99. Hereinafter referred to as NLRB.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
The term "employer" ... shall not include the United States or any wholly owned gov-
ernment corporation . or any State or political subdivision ....
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public employer.' 0 The NLRB has recently changed that historical
position and has adopted a "right to control" test. The new test, simply
stated, indicates that the private employer may be subject to NLRB
jurisdiction where the employer and the private employees are able to
bargain effectively about the terms and conditions of its employees,
that is, the employer retains sufficient control to bargain. 10 2 The new
test means that subcontractor-private employers once exempt from
NLRB jurisdiction may now find themselves under its jurisdiction.
An exercise of NLRB jurisdiction will greatly enhance the collec-
tive bargaining and strike rights of the subcontractor private employees
who are performing the duties of the subcontract for the public em-
ployer. Thus, a public employer school district that subcontracts bus
services may find that the drivers will be accorded the greater rights
granted under the National Labor Relations Act. 10 3 By the same token,
a class of public employees who are frustrated by the limitations under
a public sector collective bargaining law, particularly in a tax revolt or
crisis situation, might attempt to form or join a private corporation.
They might then offer the same services to the public employer on a
subcontract basis; the corporate employees would then have the bene-
fits of employee rights under the NLRA. Obviously, the public em-
ployer does not bargain directly with the subcontractor's private
employees, but the public employer will be directly affected by any
strike action, and be indirectly affected by the terms of any labor agree-
ment that would be reflected in that collective agreement.
Negotiating a subcontract raises a variety of issues upon which the
union and employer may not agree. Where subcontracting is permit-
ted, one issue that is raised is the rights of those employees who are laid
off. t°4 Subcontracting may be agreed to be permitted where there is a
cost saving. The cost calculation must be carefully stated, both in terms
of the dollar outlay and the quality of the services received. The im-
pact of other legislation must be measured, such as the civil service
laws. The public employer must measure the subcontract decision
against any organizational rights the displaced public employees may
101. Eg., Perkins School for the Blind, 225 N.L.R.B. 1293, 93 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1976); Roesch
Lines, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 203, 92 L.R.R.M. 1313 (1976). Other factors were also important, such
as (1) statutory enabling legislation, if any; (2) power of eminent domain; (3) tax exemptions; (4)
whether records qualify as public documents; and (5) whether the administrators are responsible
to the electorate. Electrical District No. 2, 224 N.L.R.B. 904, 93 L.R.R.M. 1017 (1976); Southwest
Texas Pub. Broadcasting Council, 227 N.L.R.B. 1560, 94 L.R.R.M. 1616 (1977).
102. National Transp. Serv., Inc., 11978-79] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 15,554.
103. We Transport, Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 111, 100 L.R.R.M. 1349 (Feb. 15, 1979). The National
Labor Relations Act is hereinafter referred to as the NLRA.
104. See notes 57-60 supra.
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be exercising at the time. The subcontract must be measured against
the potential of giving rise to NLRA jurisdiction over the performing
private employees. Finally, consideration must be given to whether the
decision or the effects of the decision are indeed subjects of mandatory
bargaining. Any subcontract must conform to applicable legislative or
administrative regulations. The negotiation of a subcontract clause be-
gins by being a fairly obvious policy decision for each side to make.
The actual negotiation, however, gives rise to many issues which inter-
relate with other statutes and other clauses in the contract.
In summary, contracting out may be seen as a way of saving
money or a way of eliminating the positions of the employees. Con-
tracting out is often subject to statutory controls as well as the exigen-
cies of collective bargaining. Private sector precedents are commonly
applied. Contracting out may mean that the public employer work will
be performed by employees having the broader rights granted by the
NLRA instead of the more restrictive public sector legislation. A com-
plex variety of issues arise in the subcontract context.
Minimum Stafjing
Minimum staffing or minimum "manning" clauses can become
very significant to the public employer faced with the necessity of mas-
sive budget reductions which will require layoffs. The contractual min-
imum number of staff per job puts a lower level on the ability of the
employer to respond. Minimums may become important to the em-
ployees too. For some employees, like fire fighters, the number of per-
sonnel available to fight a fire might relate closely to the safety of the
personnel; below certain minimums, undue risks may jeopardize the
lives of the fire fighters. For other employees, such as teachers, a mini-
mum may be seen as the dividing line between preserving a status quo
and being able to achieve a measurable positive result.
A useful exchange on this subject was initiated by the Arbitrator
E. Schmertz, who sought to include all of these points of view in his
award. The arbitrator ruled that there was a minimum limit to which
the fire department could be cut: "The City's right to reduce manning
levels and to lay off personnel is impliedly restricted by levels of safety
to the public and the levels of reasonable danger to the firemen."'' 0 5
A withering attack was mounted against the award, such that the
arbitrator felt obliged to take the unusual step of responding to the
105. City of New York Fire Dep't v. Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, 66 Lab. Arb. 261, 265
(1976) (Schmertz, Arb.).
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criticism. Among other matters, the response included a comment on
the relative accountability of the arbitrator on the one hand, and on the
other hand, the city administrators, the Washington, D.C. bureaucrats,
and judges who were making equally fateful decisions about the future
of New York City.'0 6 The matter was closed when the New York
courts ruled that minimum staffing is a managerial prerogative and not
a mandatory subject of bargaining.'0 7 A number of the issues raised by
that arbitrator remain unanswered, particularly by the courts which
seem to prefer to treat the problems in the traditional categories of del-
egation of authority and mandatory-permissive subjects of bargain-
ing.108 In other jurisdictions, minimum staffing clauses have received a
mixed record of acceptability. 109
It is commonly suggested that resolution of a fiscal crisis lies in a
redetermination of priorities as to where the money goes and where it
no longer goes. This determination is probably more judgmental than
factual in most cases. In the safety area, however, perhaps the arbitra-
tors or judges ought to require the parties to present hard data that
might lead to a more nearly factual decision. A "safety exception" for
airline pilots and others was engrafted onto the 1964 Civil Rights Act
in this manner."l0 Safety may be the most obvious example, but a simi-
lar analysis of other services might be useful. While it may be true that
"something is better than nothing," it may also be true that once a gov-
ernment service drops below a certain minimal level, it may be left with
an expensive facade doing more financial harm than social good. It is
commonly said by some today that the cost of government regulation
adds more to inflation than the benefits it returns. I " ' Similar reasoning,
106. Schmertz, The Public Safety and Personnel Cuts in the New York City Fire Department
The Role of the Impartial Chairman, 2 EMPL. REL. L.J. 155 (1976).
107. Eg., City of New Rochelle v. Crowley, 61 A.D.2d 1031, 403 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1978); Fire
Fighters of the City of Newburgh Local 589 v. Helsby, 59 A.D.2d 242, 399 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1977).
The courts did permit the negotiation of a health and safety committee to be used only within the
framework of individual and specific factual situations rather than in the framework of overall
minimal manning requirements. A fire fighter may not have to perform a particular task in a
specific situation, for example, if there were inadequate back-up.
108. See note 101 supra for Arbitrator Schmertz's test for finding a financial crisis actually
exists.
109. It was found to be a mandatory topic in Town of Narrangansett v. Fire Fighters Local
1589, [1977-78] PBC 36,098 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1977) and Connecticut Cases on Bargaining, Other
Issues, 7 PuB. PERS. AD. 5 (1978). Inadequate evidence on the safety issue was determinative in
Financially Needed Layoffs Permitted If No Irreparable Harm, Danger Caused, [1977] 727 GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 13.
110. Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
I11. E.g., Fighting Regulation With Cost and Benefit Analysis, 37 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 28
(Feb. 17, 1979).
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if true, might be applied to a reduced program resulting from fiscal
problems.
In summary, minimum staffing clauses raise important issues.
They may put a floor on budgets, involve issues of employee safety,
and determine whether employees mark time or achieve positive results
on the job. Courts appear reluctant to consider such issues, and rather
measure the problem by the extent of managerial prerogative that is
involved.
Productivity
One of the new "buzz" words of public sector bargaining is pro-
ductivity. If employee productivity increases, it is commonly said, the
taxpayer will be satisfied and the spectre of bankruptcy will no longer
haunt the employer. The problems are manifold, 1 2 but unlike many of
the other topics mentioned here, there is little specific judicial prece-
dent to act as a guide. The key to this problem lies largely outside of
the courts as well as outside of much of what arbitrators do.
Many feel that the answer to the productivity issue lies in the use
of joint labor-management committees.' 1 3 These committees might
consist of equal representation from both sides to engage in a
nonadversarial dialogue about ongoing problems. Presumably, the
committee is not engaged in continuous collective bargaining, as such.
Rather, it would be advisory and would attempt to avoid the "win-
lose" mentality of contract interpretation and negotiations. Such a
committee might be established through the contract provisions or
through "memoranda of understanding," which might accompany the
contract.
Many problems surround the use of a productivity clause. One is
the definition of productivity, and whether it contains both quantitative
and qualitative aspects. Does a larger class of students mean that a
teacher is more productive (more students) or less productive (a given
student may have had less attention and learning)? Another question
concerns the relationship between productivity and salary increases.
The minimum salary increase generally sought is that equal to the lat-
est inflationary increases in the cost of living. To avoid an inflationary
impact from wage increases, however, the increase should be accompa-
112. Eg., Special Report, Analysis of NYC Productivity Program Shows "Erosion" of Concept,
Some Successes, [1977] 719 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 24.
113. Eg., Labor-Management Committees and Productivity Bargaining, 7 PUB. PERS. AD. 3
(1978); Joint Committee to Discuss Public Sector Productivity Urged, [ 1977] 712 GOV'T EMPL. REL.
REP. (BNA) 10.
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nied by a comparable gain in productivity. Is it realistic to think in
terms of annual productivity increases equal to the eight to fifteen per-
cent inflation rate? Such gains, on an annual basis, would be astound-
ing.
Even if productivity increases, the public employer usually has no
"product" to sell to increase income, so that any productivity wage in-
crease means an overall budget increase unless the productivity in-
crease means an accompanying personnel layoff or other actual cash
saving. Minimum staffing standards is directly related to the produc-
tivity issue, as when a newly reduced workforce may find itself with old
workload. Other clauses are also relevant.
A common rule in the private sector is that the status quo (i.e.,
continuance of the contract) must generally be maintained during the
negotiation period following the expiration of the contract. 114 While
some cases permit a change in the status quo during this period, 15 the
general rule is to the contrary." 16 A somewhat different problem may
be perceived when an automatic salary increment is applicable during
this hiatus period. Some cases have decided that while the status quo
must be maintained in general, the salary increments scheduled during
the negotiation period need not be paid. The rationale, in part, is that
increasing the salary actually changes the status quo. Another part of
the rationale is that public employers may not be able to continue auto-
matic increments in the face of static or diminishing budgets. 1 7 Such
clauses may also fly in the face of productivity goals.
Another clause that may relate to the issues of productivity is the
negotiation of parity clauses. Parity clauses tie the salary of one con-
tract unit to the salary of another unit. Negotiations with one unit will
then bind the public employer to pay a comparable wage to the other.
The relative productivity of the two groups may or may not be taken
into consideration. Based upon findings that a tie-in between adminis-
trators and teachers did not encumber the ability of the school board to
negotiate effectively and that such a clause would not cause a fiscal
crisis, a tie-in clause has been permitted." 8 Others have found such
114. MORRIS, supra note 24, at 302-04.
115. Eg., Vermont State Empl. Ass'n, Inc. v. Vermont, I PBC 10,256 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 1976).
116. E.g., Cumberland Valley Educ. Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., [1977-781
PBC 36,452 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1978).
117. Galloway Twp. Bd. ofEduc. v. Galloway Twp. Educ. Ass'n, [1977-78] PBC 36,369 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1978); Board of Cooperative Educ. Servs. v. New York State Publ. Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 753, 395 N.Y.S.2d 439, 363 N.E.2d 1174 (1977).
118. Niagara Wheatfield Adm'rs Ass'n v. Niagara Wheatfield Central School Dist., 44 N.Y.2d
68, 404 N.Y.S.2d 82, 375 N.E.2d 37 (1978). See also City Didn't Violate Act Because of Negotiators'
Pledge, 7 PUB. PERS. AD. 6 (1978).
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clauses to be illegal, citing such problems as the coercive effect on the
public employer or the adverse impact on unions not included in the
tie-in.' 19 While the parity clauses have met with a mixed reception, a
number of other clauses are closely related.
A common criterion used by interest arbitrators to assist in deter-
mining wages is the comparability test. The wage award in a particular
unit will be measured by the wage in other comparable units.' 20 The
comparability test as such does not necessarily give any measure of
productivity. It seems to further assume that because the jobs are simi-
lar, the output must also be similar. This approach tends to beg the
question. Yet another non-parity standard that approximates the re-
suits of a parity clause is the use of a fixed wage guideline promulgated
by the White House or a legislative body.' 2 ' A guideline upper limit
that is less than the rate of inflation tends to become the minimum
wage increase sought by the union, without serious consideration being
given to productivity. The concern expressed about parity clauses may
be genuine, but there is little reason to limit that concern to parity
clauses. Many of the same factors, at least vis-A-vis productivity, are at
play in comparability analysis or guideline limitations.
122
The relationship between the various clauses in the contract can be
highlighted by references to the productivity issue. A relationship be-
tween productivity, minimum staffing standards, and other causes has
been suggested. When the courts and legislatures are deciding which
subjects of bargaining are mandatory and which are managerial pre-
119. New Jersey Public Employment Update, 7 Pup. PERS. AD. 5 (1978); Pennsylvania: PLRB
Rules on Varied Subjects, 7 PuB. PERS. AD. 4 (1978).
120. City of Council Bluffs v. AFSCME Local 2844, 70 Lab. Arb. 1258 (1978) (Winton, Arb.);
City Water, Light & Power Dep't v. Electrical Workers Local 193, 66 Lab. Arb. 511 (1976) (Erbs,
Arb.); City of Kenosha v. Kenosha Professional Policemen's Ass'n, 63 Lab. Arb. 126 (1974)
(Rauch, Arb.). But see Berkowitz supra note 16.
121. Binding Pay Raise Award Reaffirmed by Arbitrator, [1979] 803 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP.
(BNA) 6 (5.5% wage guideline).
122. A variety of other clauses might also relate to the productivity issue. Increased on-site
visitation by supervisors aggressively seeking out the idle was found to be a management right.
ALJ Finds No Violation In Failure to Consult on Productivity Tours, [1976] 667 Gov'T EMPL. REL.
REP. (BNA) A-9. Imposing the use of a timeclock on teachers was found to be a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Butte Teachers' Union No. 332 v. Board of Educ., 567 P.2d 51 (Mont.
1977). Job reclassification was a management right. In re McMahon, 394 A.2d 1136 (Vt. 1978).
Assigning supervisors to do the work of laid-off unit workers may breach a contract. Ohio Uni-
versity v. AFSCME Local 1699, 66 Lab. Arb. 452 (1976) (Gibson, Arb.). Cancellation of
rescheduling of overtime may be a mandatory subject of bargaining. Compare Milwaukee Profes-
sional Firefighters Local 215 v. City of Milwaukee, 78 Wis. 2d 1, 253 N.W.2d 481 (1977) with FAA
v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 68 Lab. Arb. 375 (1977) (Moore, Arb.). Arrival and
departure times, as well as tardiness rules, may be mandatory subjects of bargaining. Byram Twp.
v. Byram Twp. Educ. Ass'n, [1977-78] PBC 36,027 (N.J. 1977); Albany v. Helsby, [1977-78] PBC
36,028 (N.Y. S. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
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rogatives, note should be taken of these relationships. It is rarely
done. 12 3 Without a careful look at the overall picture, the mandatory
elements of bargaining might be structured in such a way as to preserve
or even create less productive operations.
Giving management the unilateral authority to decide minimum
staffing (ie., a managerial prerogative and not a mandatory subject of
bargaining) becomes effective in the overall social sense only when the
manager is willing to conscientiously exercise the power; the sole re-
sponsibility is shifted to the public manager. In light of fiscal crises and
taxpayers' revolts, one wonders whether there is something wrong in
the approach. Perhaps this is one reason why the joint committee ap-
proach is suggested, to avoid the legalisms that artificially force actual
bargaining into channels that may not represent the real problems in-
volved in crisis and revolt. Bargaining decisions tend to focus prima-
rily on economic concerns. 124 Productivity includes not only monetary
factors, but also work environment, leadership, psychological factors,
training, equipment, customer relations, and the like. If the traditional
bargaining structure will not permit this wide-ranging exchange and
obligate both sides to approach it in good faith, perhaps there is some
problem in the bargaining structure as created by the courts and legis-
lative bodies.
In summary, productivity clauses are in their infancy. Definitional
problems are still paramount. A number of other clauses can impact
on productivity clauses, such as automatic wage increase clauses, parity
clauses, or comparability tests. Even when the issues of productivity
clauses are resolved, any productivity wage increases that are granted
must be funded.
Appropriations and Funding
Many of the contract clauses require funding. Funding is a multi-
step process involving a budget request to the legislative body, an ap-
propriation by the legislative body, and a disbursement by the em-
ployer. Some contracts may be funded out of already existing
appropriations, while others may require legislative action. The public
employer who is in a condition of fiscal constraint may have second
thoughts about the contract. These may be expressed by failure to re-
quest the appropriation, or failure to make the disbursement out of the
123. E.g., National Educ. Ass'n v. USD 501, 225 Kan. 445, 592 P.2d 93 (1979); New Jersey v.
State Supervisory Employees Ass'n, 78 N.J. 54, 393 A.2d 233 (1978).
124. See, e.g., Charles City Commun. School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 275
N.W.2d 766 (Iowa 1979); National Educ. Ass'n v. USD 501, 225 Kan. 445, 592 P.2d 93 (1979).
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available appropriation. Cases of this character have not yet been re-
ported in the true crisis situation, but have arisen in other situations.
It is commonly stated that an employer cannot be bound to the
expenditure of funds until the funds have been appropriated.125 Where
funds have been appropriated but the contract settlement conflicts with
higher budgetary priorities, the employer may still be required to adjust
the priority of appropriated funds to meet the obligations under the
contract. The contract items may have to be given priority status in the
budget,126 or the employer may have to resort to the use of contingency
funds or statutory emergency powers.1 27 Some courts, probably a mi-
nority, are more restrictive and do not permit the contracts to "come off
the top," partly because of the inevitable conflict that might arise be-
tween the last two contracts.
128
Where two or more public bodies are involved, conflict may arise.
For example, a school committee might sign a contract that was within
the appropriations, but the town council, having the sole authority to
actually spend, might refuse to honor the obligation. In such a case, the
supremacy of the school committee was upheld on policy grounds and
the contract was honored. 29 In the situation where the appropriation
must be requested, the obligated party will be bound at least to make
the request. 130 Where good faith efforts are promised, a dispute over
the adequacy of the efforts may be subject to arbitration.' 3' Another
approach to enforcing the promise to seek appropriations to fund an
agreed upon contract is to reason that a part of the obligation of good
faith negotiations is the requirement that the employer do those things
125. Delaware v. AFSCME Local 1726, 298 A.2d 362 (Del. Chan. Ct. 1972); Bennett v. SEIU
Local 254, 2 PBC 20,327 (Mass. 1976); Ortblad v. Washington, 85 Wash. 2d 109, 530 P.2d 635
(1975). A multi-year contract in a jurisdiction with annual appropriations may be questioned.
Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Teachers Union Local 1, 26 111. App. 3d 806, 326 N.E.2d 158 (1975).
126. Delaware v. AFSCME Local 1726, 298 A.2d 362 (Del. Chan. Ct. 1972).
127. County of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, 87 Wash. 2d 457, 553 P.2d 1316 (1976).
128. Negotiators May Agree, But Legislature Has to Appropriate, Florida Court Rules, [1979]
802 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 12. Also, in this case there was a legislative letter of intent
limiting the appropriation for salaries to $5.1 million, even though the budget was larger. The
court found the limitation binding and would not honor the $6.6 million request. See also Minne-
sota Court Orders Compliance with Back Pay Award for $1,500,000, 11979] 804 GOV'T EMPL. REL.
REP. (BNA) 17.
129. Norton Teachers Ass'n v. Town of Norton, 361 Mass. 150, 279 N.E.2d 659 (1972). See
also Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769, 352 N.E.2d 914
(1976).
130. Boston Teachers Union Local 66 v. School Comm., 76 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1515, 350 N.E.2d
707 (1976).
131. Association of Pa. State College & Univ. Faculties v. Pennsylvania, 373 A.2d 1175 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1977). The court noted that since the arbitrator could not appropriate the money,
awards which sought to create a binding obligation might violate the law. However, the court
preferred not to anticipate the problem.
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within its power necessary for performance of the contract. 132 The
problems of requesting and supporting a request for funds is com-
pounded where a predecessor in a public office bears a responsibility to
"sponsor and support" the appropriation request, but is no longer in
office when the request is actually made. One ruling in such a case was
that the successor office holder is obligated to put the request before the
appropriating body, but the successor may not be bound to "support"
the matter. 1
33
In summary, public monies cannot be spent until they are appro-
priated by the authorized body. Where funds have yet to be appropri-
ated, the contract may put the employer under the burden of making
the appropriation request and, in some cases, supporting it.
Guidelines and Restrictions
Public employers are often under statutory or administrative com-
mands to have the budget prepared or submitted to the voters by a
certain date. The budgeting deadline may pass before negotiations can
be completed. If, during negotiations, a budget is approved that would
not fully fund the union's proposals, the negotiations can be seriously
jeopardized. These general matters have reached the courts and boards
in various ways.
A rule that is gradually developing is that the public employer will
not be restricted in budget preparation by on-going negotiations, so
long as matters proceed in good faith. 134 By the same token, a union
that is otherwise bargaining in good faith may aggressively seek the
appropriation needed to fund its proposals from the appropriate legis-
lative body. 135 Again, there would seem to be a good faith require-
ment. Where the budget process results in an appropriation, the
appropriation will constitute the outside limit for overall funding, al-
though presumably funds may be shifted within the overall budget
from one category to another. 136 However, a line of cases may be de-
veloping in which a budget deadline date will also be interpreted as the
132. Delaware v. AFSCME Local 1726, 298 A.2d 362 (Del. Chan. Ct. 1972); Mendes v. City of
Taunton, 366 Mass. 109, 315 N.E.2d 865 (1974).
133. Labor Relations Comm'n v. Board of Selectmen, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 657, 373 N.E.2d 1165
(1978).
134. Spokane Educ. Ass'n v. Barnes, 83 Wash. 2d 366, 517 P.2d 1362 (1974); Rutgers Council,
AAUP v. New Jersey Bd. of Higher Educ., 126 N.J. Sup. 53, 312 A.2d 677 (1973); Newark Teach-
ers Ass'n v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 57 N.J. 100, 278 A.2d 14 (1970) (per curiam); Mt. Vernon Police
Ass'n v. Board of Estimate, I PBC 10,074 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
135. There are few cases, but one is Sanford School Comm. v. Sanford Teachers Ass'n, [1979-
80] PBC 40,762 (Maine Labor Relations Bd. 1978) (summary of decision).
136. See note 20 supra.
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deadline for negotiations and impasse procedures.137
Budgeting procedures may cause some problems. Other problems
may be caused by limitations expressed in the law other than that of
collective bargaining. Legislation may restrict the use of public funds
in certain areas. This will restrict the bargaining, although the parties
may not be aware of it at the time of negotiation. An obvious example
is a legislative wage freeze. The impasse arbitrator in those circum-
stances cannot include increases in an award. 38 Public employer con-
tributions to a government pension fund or the terms of a disability
insurance program may be spelled out by legislation. 39 A maximum
percent of contribution may be fixed or equal contributions may be
required for all units. In these situations, the parties will not be able to
negotiate increases beyond the statutory maximums or preferred status
for one group of employees where the legislation provides for uniform
application. 40
Guidelines or budget restriction problems might also arise in con-
flict between two governmental groups. An advisory committee might
indicate their line item priorities in the budget, but the operating
agency may negotiate a contract where salary figure differs from that of
the advisory group. In such a case, one court ruled that the operating
agency needed the flexibility to rejuggle figures within the limits of the
overall budget.' 4' The issue potentially creates a problem for a public
137. City of Des Moines v. Public Employment Relations Bd., [1979-80] PBC 36,517 (Iowa
1979), interpreted in Maquoketa Valley Commun. School Dist. v. Maquoketa Valley Educ. Ass'n,
[1979-80] PBC 36,539 (Iowa 1979). See also Wasco County v. AFSCME Local 2752, [1977-78]
PBC 136,055 (Or. Ct. App. 1977). The practical upshot is that the parties may have to begin
negotiations at a much earlier date.
138. City of Humboldt v. Humboldt County Deputy Sheriffs Org., 72 Lab. Arb. 63 (1978)
(Henderson, Drake, & Treece, Fact Finders).
139. Fringe benefits may play an especially important role in the budget of the public em-
ployer since they constitute an important part of the overall budget. Report on NYC Employee
Fringes Draws Detailed Union Rebuttals, [1976] 669 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-9; Forum
Discusses Employee Compensation in Terms of Fiscal Crisis Facing Cities, [1976] 667 GOV'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) B-6. Pensions seem to be the focal point. The actual payout is delayed until the
retirement occurs. An elected public employer might be willing to be generous on this item be-
cause it will have little immediate cost but may forestall a strike that would cause a reelection risk.
The public employer may have left the scene by the time the pension comes due and begins to be a
heavy budget strain. Scope ofArbitrator's Obligation to Review Financial Issues in Public Sector
Disputes Review Before NAA, [1976] 657 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-3.
140. Mass. Supreme Court- Arbitration Panel Can't Increase Insurance Contributions, 8 PuB.
PEAS. AD. 1 (1979); Watertown Firefighters Local 1347 v. Town of Watertown, 383 N.E.2d 494
(Mass. 1978); Fair Lawn Educ. Ass'n v. Fair Lawn Bd. of Educ., 161 N.J. Super. 67, 390 A.2d 1194
(1978); Board of Educ. v. Piscatoway Maintenance & Custodial Ass'n, 152 N.J. Super. 235, 377
A.2d 938 (1977); City of Jeannette v. Police Jeannette Lodge No. 24, 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 64, 366
A.2d 602 (1976).
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employer agency which uses a citizen advisory board on the budget.
The citizen group may feel misused if the employer does not follow the
budget guidelines that they established. The public employer, how-
ever, needs the operational flexibility to transfer funds to meet opera-
tional realities, such as a collective bargaining agreement negotiated
after the budget recommendations. One solution would be to legislate
the guidelines in advance, i.e., prohibit or limit cost of living increases.
Any attempt to legislate restrictions after the contract has been ap-
proved, and after the contract rights have vested, will run afoul of the
prohibition on the impairment of contracts, absent a true emergency.1
42
If a complex statutory scheme is imposed, however, it may have the
effect of preempting collective bargaining.
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In summary, bargaining can generally continue despite the pas-
sage of the employer's budget or the passing of budget deadlines.
However, limitations on negotiations may be found in legislation cov-
ering pensions or fiscal crisis wage freezes, for example. Where multi-
agencies are involved in the budgeting process, generally the "line" or-
ganization can reorder priorities to meet contractual demands.
OVERVIEW
One of the more obvious aspects of the relationship between the
public employer and the public union is that the level of rhetoric is
much more shrill than the facts available to either side would warrant.
A provable financial crisis is rare outside of New York City. However,
the public employer will cry "crisis" in a number of different situations.
Among those situations are the employer's fear of what may happen
tomorrow, the effort to mask a shift of priorities or change of attitudes
that cannot be funded unless the collective bargaining agreement is
broken (as a rationale to deny all requests when the employer has a
discretionary power to accept or reject requests on the basis of some
substantive principle), and creating the right atmosphere in collective
bargaining and budget elections. The union responds in a similar man-
ner. The union will counter the employer's crisis claim by simply deny-
ing its existence, merely pointing to a large overall budget and insisting
that it must contain excess funds, by claiming its particular unit is faced
with a disproportionate burden compared to other units, by alleging
subterfuge, or by claiming a statutory requirement that the employer
must provide at least a minimum level of mandated services. Having
142. See notes 41-42 supra.
143. See notes 135-36 supra.
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made their claims, both sides are hard pressed to present facts which
verify them. There is an obvious need for both sides to soften the
claims and improve their factual presentations.
The taxpayer is entitled to thorough factfinding, and if the parties
are unwilling or unable, then some legislated third party involvement
would seem to be warranted. Putting the burden of proof on the parties
in an adversarial relationship may not be the better approach, particu-
larly when the public is not being primarily represented by either side.
As long as the parties to the negotiations are dealing in a rhetoric that
stretches the facts, they both lose credibility and bargain with some-
thing less than good faith.
Another point that seems to be suggested by the cases involves the
reaction to an impending crisis. The typical reaction by the public em-
ployer, by the union, and often by courts and legislatures, is to propose
or take some broad, across-the-board action. In the absence of the rare
immediate crisis, more selective action would seem to be more efficient
and would raise fewer legal problems. Attrition may be better than
layoff. Future employees need not be treated in the same manner as
existing employees with vested rights. Less critical services might be
reduced before touching essential services. Specific legislation directed
toward specific problems may be more efficient than broad grants of
authority, just as more specific language by the courts might contribute
more toward potential solutions. The present general approach is to
recognize extremely broad authority to remedy a rare but true crisis,
and to maintain the status quo in all other situations. A middle ap-
proach might be preferable in some situations. Overstating the situa-
tion and overreacting to the problem does little to protect the public
interest.
When a true crisis is recognized, the legislative and judicial re-
sponse is to shift major decisional power to the employer and reduce or
eliminate the role of the union and arbitrator. Whatever else is said,
the employer's prior decisions were at least partially responsible for the
crisis. The return to unilateral decision making may be questioned on
policy grounds. This is not to suggest that the employer is solely to
"blame" for the circumstances. Rather, it is to suggest that a broader
information base for decision making might continue to be useful even
in the time of fiscal crisis. Where a decision must be made immedi-
ately, of course, the public employer is the only one who can respond in
a timely fashion. However, the fiscal crisis has many long-term issues
where time is not of the essence. In these situations, it seems unneces-
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sary and unwise to completely eliminate the multilateral decision mak-
ing processes.
Public sector collective bargaining, as a policy choice, substitutes
multilateral decision making for unilateral decision making. One can
argue that this is for the sole benefit of the union and employees. How-
ever, one can also rationally argue that there is a public benefit beyond
a lessening of employee strife. Decision making in the public sector in
general, as contrasted with private sector decision making, is character-
ized by input from a variety of different sources.
The process is supposed to be more open and public than private
decision making. If this is an accurate view, public sector bargaining
can be viewed as a legislative choice that is consistent with this policy
by adding input from the union and the arbitrator into what the em-
ployer might otherwise have considered. The longer the bargaining
process is applicable, the more the public policy benefits from both the
increased informational input and the more open character of the proc-
ess. The rejection of this public policy through the closing down of the
bargaining process should be as gradual as possible. If a minimization
of multilateral decision making is actually needed, a midway step
would be to convert the bargaining and arbitration roles into advisory
roles, before completely eliminating them. This would preserve the in-
tent of legislation and still keep the bargaining process from becoming
a "suicide pact." If the advisory approach were adopted during the
pendency of the true crisis, it would of course be incumbent on the
public employer to give public reasons why the advice was rejected in
situations where that was the result.
In brief, Arbitrator Schmertz raised a number of questions which
cannot be satisfactorily answered by simply finding a managerial pre-
rogative. 44 Where a legislative policy of multilateral decision making
such as collective bargaining has been adopted, that policy deserves
greater protection than can be provided solely by labor relations analy-
sis. The labor relations analysis leaves out the important nature of the
decision making process, which process presumptively benefits the pub-
lic.
Exclusive reliance on the labor relations/managerial prerogative
analysis is weakened by another factor. In the private sector, the check
on the managerial prerogative is presumably the forces of the market
place. In the public sector, the market place does not exist, as such.
Rather, the taxpayer-citizen can check the use of the prerogative in a
144. See note 101 supra.
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variety of ways, including replacement of manager through election
and political processes. The adoption of and maximum continuation of
the collective bargaining process becomes another of the devices that is
useful in the control process. The decision to eliminate the process in a
crisis should look to the value of collective bargaining or comple-
menting other processes in public decision making, as well as looking
to some inherent power of managers to order a workforce. Ordering a
workforce involves public decision making in the public sector, and
therefore takes on significantly different dimensions than the same de-
cision in the private sector. Public decisions should be made as pub-
licly as possible, and collective bargaining, where it is adopted as a
policy, adds to that process. Exclusive reliance on managerial preroga-
tive analysis minimizes that process.
With the New York and California precedents, it seems likely that
the major guidelines to the solution of a long term fiscal crisis lie in
legislation. The legislation will be directed toward mandatory person-
nel actions that substitute legislated choices for bargained decisions.
Legislation will beget legislation, as the unions shift from the bargain-
ing table to lobbying. Where the legislation affects existing contracts,
careful drafting must be used to minimize the constitutional impair-
ment arguments. Adding a legislated bureaucratic layer to the bargain-
ing process presents opportunities and obstacles to both public
employers and unions.
Where federal legislation is involved, the example of the urban
transit legislation is relevant. Public unions can seek to expand em-
ployee rights through this type legislation, which provides public funds.
Public employers can similarly attempt to maximize the managerial
prerogative which minimizes bargaining, either through positive state-
ment in the legislation or through blocking union efforts to gain rights
in the legislation. State level legislation may be used to impact on sub-
contracting, minimum staffing, recall rights of laid-off employees, and
the like. The existing problems arising from the addition of public col-
lective bargaining legislation onto an existing statutory scheme of per-
sonnel and merit system legislation will be compounded.
A long-run critical issue will be whether bargaining can survive
this process. Assuming that it does survive, it is likely to become much
different than it is today. One of these differences may involve the role
of impasse arbitration, in situations when arbitration is substituted for
the strike. The arbitration process is likely to involve a more explicit
recognition of the public interest. Traditionally, arbitration resolves a
dispute between antagonistic parties. In public sector bargaining, the
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interests that are involved should more explicitly encompass a public
interest that is distinct from the adversarial interests of the public em-
ployer and employees. If, for example, the movement toward public
bargaining sessions accelerates, 45 the logical outcome will be public
participation in the arbitration process. Multi-party arbitration could
result, with the position of the arbitrator being changed from that of
private person to public decision maker.
Another avenue that might be followed would be to have some
public, but non-judicial review of the impasse award. 146 Whatever the
outcome, however, the immediate effect of taxpayer revolt or fiscal cri-
sis is to cause more public scrutiny of the public sector bargaining pro-
cess and result. It seems likely that this increased public participation
will become institutionalized in a new generation of public sector bar-
gaining legislation.
CONCLUSION
Taxpayers' revolt and fiscal crisis require reexamination of collec-
tive bargaining as well as budgeting processes and decision making.
Public sector collective bargaining is an integral part of many budget-
ary processes. As budget decision making processes are changed, pub-
lic sector bargaining will also be changed. A likely result is a greater
statutory overlay which may require that a public interest factor be ad-
ded to the traditional adversarial interests of the public employer and
public employees. Traditional judicial analysis which focuses prima-
rily on the extent of the managerial prerogative is inadequate.
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